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Over the last decades, Common Foreign and Security Policy sanctions have become a 
major aspect of the EU’s foreign policy. They have also led to a massive amount of 
litigation before the CJEU. The case of EU sanctions adopted in the aftermath of the 
crisis in Ukraine is symptomatic of that.  
 
As a response to what is considered by the EU as an illegal annexation of Crimea and a 
deliberate destabilisation of Ukraine by Russia, the former has adopted a series of 
economic sanctions against the latter. In particular, the EU has adopted restrictive 
measures towards persons and entities considered as supporting Russia’s actions of 
destabilisation and threatening of Ukraine’s integrity, sovereignty and independence. The 
EU has also targeted certain persons and entities with regard to the situation in Ukraine. 
The purpose was to consolidate and support democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine, 
and to maintain its territorial integrity. Special emphasis was put on imposing sanctions 
on persons that were subject to criminal proceedings in Ukraine in connection with 
misappropriations of public funds.  
 
As from their adoption, these EU sanctions have been perceived as rather controversial. 
Since no measures were taken at the UN level due to the presence of Russia in the 
Security Council and a lack of consensus between the UN Member States, the EU 
adopted sanctions autonomously. Due to the features of these restrictive measures, their 
mere adoption and implementation has been called into question. For instance, the fact 
that the EU targeted individuals under criminal investigation in their country for the 
misappropriation of States funds, usually upon the request of the Ukrainian judiciary, 
bore a risk of restrictive measures being used to target political opponents.1 The most 
critical authors consider that the legality of these sanctions is “disputable”,2 or even that 
they are unjustified.3 
 
The first waves of sanctions against Russia were adopted after the referendum on 
Crimea’s independence in 2014.4 Most of them have been renewed ever since.5 The EU 
targeted persons close to the Russian power, among which a major shareholder of a 
company involved in the construction of a bridge connecting Russia to Crimea,6 and a 
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journalist and head of a Russian State news agency which, according to the EU, 
developed a government propaganda supporting the Russian operations in Ukraine.7 
They were mostly the subject of a freeze of assets. Following the downing of the Malaysia 
Airlines Flight 17 (MH17/MAS17), the EU targeted Russian undertakings operating in 
crucial areas, such as the defense sector (for instance, Almaz-Antey8), the oil and gas 
sector (e.g. Gazprom9 and Rosneft10) and the banking and financial sector, with Russian-
owned banks such as Sberbank of Russia,11 VTB Bank,12 and the Bank for Development 
and Foreign Economic Affairs13 being targeted. Most of them were the subject of asset 
freezes and restriction of access to capital markets and defense, dual-use goods or 
sensitive technologies.14 
 
As regards the situation within Ukraine, the EU targeted an important number of persons 
that were subject to criminal proceedings in Ukraine in connection with misappropriations 
of public funds. In order to support Ukraine and its judiciary in their investigation and 
proceedings, the EU provided for the freezing of the funds and assets of the persons 
concerned. The majority of these measures targeted Ukrainian leaders with strong 
connections to Russia: former President Viktor Yanukovych,15 former Prime ministers 
Mykola Azarov16 and Sergej Arbuzov,17 former Energy Ministry Edward Stavytskyi,18 
former members of the Yanukovych administration such as Andriy Portnov19 as well as 
Andrii Klyuyev.20 Family members of some leaders were also the subject of restrictive 
measures (e.g. Oleksandr Yanukovych21 and Oleksii Azarov22). Most of them were listed 
in the first EU acts providing for restrictive measures against Ukraine,23 and some of 
these restrictive measures have been renewed ever since.24 The EU also targeted 
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Ukrainian undertakings considered as being controlled by Russian firms close to the 
Russian central power. This was the case of Prominvestbank,25 a Ukrainian bank in 
which the majority of the capital was held by a Russian bank. 
 
An important number of targeted persons have challenged the validity of the restrictive 
measures before the CJEU, mostly in the framework of actions for annulment. This has 
led to a substantial caseload: so far, the CJEU has issued almost 40 judgments on 
sanctions against Ukrainian persons and 12 on sanctions against Russians persons. A 
dozen cases are still pending.26 This litigation raised important legal issues linked to the 
CFSP, among which the extremely wide margin of appreciation of the Council regarding 
the adoption of restrictive measures, and the extent of judicial review to be exercised by 
the Court over them.  
 
This contribution offers some reflections on the impact of these judgments on the law 
and framework of restrictive measures. First, attention will be given to the evolutions in 
the Court’s apprehension of the sanctions against Russian and Ukrainian persons, as 
well as the developments in the substantive law of restrictive measures (1). This is 
followed by some reflections on whether or not the Court has used the opportunity of this 
case law to make the CFSP framework evolve. Indeed, one can notice, in spite of its 
failure to address some critical issues linked to the CFSP, a certain activism of the Court 
when adjudicating these measures (2). Lastly, this contribution will briefly assess some 
perspectives of evolution in the field of judicial review of restrictive measures (3). 
 
 
1. Impact of the CJEU rulings on the law of restrictive measures  
1.1. Outcome of the cases 
 
In the majority of the studied cases, the sanctions imposed by the EU were annulled by 
the CJEU. Certainly, this assertion could be qualified by the outcome of the cases on 
sanctions against Russians: with the notable exception of Rotenberg,27 almost all the 
restrictive measures targeting Russian natural and legal persons were upheld by the 
Court. As regards sanctions against the Ukrainian intelligentsia, however, the outcome 
was clear-cut: the wide majority of them were annulled by the CJEU. Cases such as 
Oleksii Azarov,28 Klyuyev,29 Yanukovych,30 Pshonka31 and Klymenko32 led to an 
annulment of the sanctions in first instance. In other cases,33 the sanctions were upheld 
by the General Court but ultimately annulled by the Court of Justice.  
 
One of the main reasons for the annulment of the restrictive measures was related to the 
motivation of the Council decisions pursuant to Article 296 TFEU. The CJEU has often 
sanctioned the fact that the Council, in order to impose sanctions on Ukrainian persons 
being the subject to criminal proceedings for misappropriation of public funds, relied on 
a letter of a Ukrainian prosecutor-general that was not precise enough on the 
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establishment of the facts and on the individual responsibility of the applicants towards 
them.34 In a more global way, “regardless of the stage reached in the proceedings to 
which the [applicants were] allegedly subject, the Council could not adopt restrictive 
measures against [them] because it was not aware of the facts of misappropriation of 
public funds specifically alleged against [them] by the Ukrainian authorities”.35 It is only 
by being aware of these facts that the Council could have established that they could 
qualify as misappropriation of public funds, and call into question the rule of law in 
Ukraine. In other words, since the EU restrictive measures meant to support the rule of 
law in Ukraine, the Council had to make sure that the targeted persons had threatened 
such rule of law.  
 
The same lack of compliance with the obligation to state reasons was sanctioned 
regarding the measures imposed on Russian persons or entities which, by their conduct, 
were responsible for actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. An example of that is the Rotenberg case. 
This person had connexions with the Russian power through his personal relationship 
with President Putin. He was also the major shareholder of a company that built a bridge 
connecting Crimea to Russia. Therefore, he was targeted by sanctions on the ground 
that he benefitted from one of the Russian decision-makers responsible for the 
annexation of Crimea.36 According to the Court, the Council failed to prove in a satisfying 
manner that the applicant did control the said company.37 In addition, in order to impose 
sanctions on that person it was necessary that the Russian decision-makers in question 
had “at the very least […] started to prepare the annexation of Crimea and the 
destabilisation of Ukraine”38 before signing a contract with the Russian company. 
Otherwise, the persons targeted by the sanctions could not have been aware of the 
involvement of those decision-makers in the preparation39 (and therefore would not have 
been eligible to the sanctions).  
 
Overall, there has been a double trend of the Court when assessing the validity of EU 
sanctions against Russians and Ukrainians. Firstly, most of the sanctions that were 
annulled by the Court were those targeting Ukrainian persons. In 28 out of 32 cases on 
sanctions against Ukrainians, the restrictive measures were annulled by the CJEU. By 
contrast, only 1 case on sanctions against Russia led to the annulment of the sanctions. 
One might inevitably wonder which factors led to these different outcomes. Secondly, 
most of the sanctions that were annulled due to an insufficient motivation of the Council 
were those targeting natural persons. One can reasonably deduce that the Court has 
been more severe in its appreciation of sanctions targeting natural persons than when 
assessing those imposed on legal ones. This might be due to its awareness that 
consequences of such restrictive measures can be more damaging for individuals than 
for undertakings.   
  
1.2. Developments in the substantive law of restrictive measures 
The CJEU case law on sanctions against Russians and Ukrainians is entrenched in a 
set of case law on restrictive measures that has developed over the last decades. Since 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, much progress has been made in terms of 
                                                          
34 See, for instance, Arbuzov, T-434/14, supra note 17, paragraph 39; Oleksandr Yanukovych, T-348/14, 
supra note 21. 
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36 Rotenberg, supra note 6. 
37 Ibid, paragraph 84. 




judicial protection of targeted persons.40 Thus, a certain number of jurisprudential 
developments had already taken place when the CJEU started adjudicating sanctions 
against Ukrainians and Russians.41  
 
This is particularly true regarding the obligation to state reasons. An example of that is 
the General Court recalling in Oleksandr Yanukovych that “the statement of reasons for 
an asset-freezing cannot consist merely of a general, stereotypical formulation. Such a 
measure must indicate the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers that 
the relevant legislation is applicable to the person concerned” ,42 thereby referring to its 
Ben Ali43 case law.  
 
There have been, nevertheless, visible developments. As stressed by C. Beaucillon, the 
CJEU case law on sanctions targeting countries, such as those against Russians and 
Ukrainians, “is probably now set to exceed that concerning counterterrorism in terms of 
case load and innovation”.44 It is connected to a new situation, since the EU is trying both 
to help Ukraine reestablish the rule of law in its own territory and to pressure Russia to 
stop destabilising it. In that way, the CJEU case law on sanctions against Russia and 
Ukrainian leaders can be seen, to some extent, as a ‘laboratory of law’. 
 
Firstly, the ECJ ruled on the admissibility of actions for annulment brought by targeted 
entities against ban exports which were applicable to undertakings subject to EU law. 
Russian undertakings can be considered as directly affected by such export bans in the 
meaning of Article 263§4 TFEU, and therefore entitled to challenge them before the 
Court, regardless of the fact that those measures were only applicable to undertakings 
subject to EU law and that the Russian undertakings were not prohibited from carrying 
out the operations concerned outside the Union.45 The determining factor is that these 
export bans provided for restrictions to market access upon the applicants.46 
 
Secondly, the Court addressed the extent to which the EU could sanction the 
misappropriation of public funds. The restrictive measures were justified in the view of 
supporting democracy, the rule of law and the institutional foundations of Ukraine. These 
were threatened by the fact that “a significant part of the former Ukrainian leadership 
[was] suspected of having committed serious crimes in the management of public 
resources”.47 Facilitating their prosecution was considered as contributing to the support 
of the rule of law in Ukraine.48 However, this does not mean that any act classifiable as 
a misappropriation of public fund and committed in a third country can justify EU action.49 
The Court gave a definition of the misappropriations of public funds that can lead to the 
adoption of restrictive measures: those  
 
“which, having regard to the amount or the type of funds or assets 
misappropriated or to the context in which the offence took place, are, at the very 
least, such as to undermine the legal and institutional foundations of Ukraine, and 
                                                          
40 S. POLI, “Effective Judicial Protection and Its limits in the case law concerning individual restrictive 
measures in the European Union”, in E. NEFRAMI, M. GATTI (eds.), Constitutional Issues of EU External 
Relations Law, Luxembourg Legal Studies, Volume 16, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2018, p.296. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Oleksandr Yanukovych, T-348/14, supra note 21, paragraph 80. 
43 General Court, 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v. Council, T-200/14, EU:T:2016:216, paragraph 96. 
44C. BEAUCILLON, “Opening up the horizon: the CJEU's new take on country sanctions, Common Market 
Law Review n°55, 2018, p. 387. 
45 Prominvestbank, supra note 25, paragraph 49; Vnesheconombank, T-737/14, supra note 13, paragraph 
49. 
46 Ibid; Gazprom, supra note 9, paragraph 75. 
47 Klyuyev, T-340/15, supra note 20, paragraph 117. 
48 Ibid, paragraph 118. 
49 Oleksandr Yanukovych, T-348/14, supra note 21, paragraph 100. 
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in particular the principles of legality, the prohibition of arbitrary exercise of power 
by the executive, effective judicial review and equality before the law and, 
ultimately, undermining respect for the rule of law in that country”.50  
 
The CJEU has also explained that, in some circumstances, the absence of criminal 
proceedings or of a pre-trial investigation in Ukraine did not necessarily mean that the 
Council could not adopt restrictive measures,51 recalling its discretion in that matter. 
Finally, the Court has acknowledged the wide margin of appreciation of the Council 
regarding the amount of funds and assets that can be frozen: in case of an impossibility 
to assess the amount of public funds that became a targeted person’s property, the 
Council is entitled to impose a full freeze.52  
 
Thirdly, the Court has ruled on the extent to which the Council could target Russian 
persons and, in particular, on the notion of active or material support to Russian actions 
destabilising Ukraine. In Kiselev the CJEU defined the concept of active support by 
“forms of support which, by their quantitative or qualitative significance, contribute to the 
continuance of the actions and policies of the Russian Government destabilising 
Ukraine”.53 It concluded that large-scale media can provide such an active support.54 The 
Court also established the distinction between material support and direct participation 
in the actions of destabilisation. Such direct participation is not necessary55 as long as 
the undertaking concerned supplied Russia with heavy weapons which were, in turn, 
supplied to Ukrainian separatists.56 This is because the objective of those measures is 
“not to penalize certain entities because of their links with the situation in Ukraine, but to 
impose economic sanctions on the Russian Federation, in order to increase the costs of 
its actions”57 of destabilisation. Consequently, the Court upheld restrictive measures on 
Russian undertakings that did not participate, even indirectly, to the Ukrainian crisis: the 
mere fact that they operated on crucial sectors of the Russian economy was considered 
as a sufficient basis to impose the sanctions.58 
 
Lastly, interesting developments were laid down on the balance between the 
fundamental rights of the persons targeted and the objectives of the restrictive measures. 
In Kiselev, the Court considered that the freedom of expression protected by Article 11 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) could be limited for the purpose of 
putting an end to Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine.59 The Court also recalled that the 
challenged restrictive measures were compatible with the right to property60 and, in the 
case of undertakings, with the freedom to conduct business.61 Those sanctions are 
“protective measures”62 and are not supposed to deprive the targeted persons of these 
rights.63 Moreover, they are “by nature temporary and reversible and do not therefore 
infringe the ‘essential content’ of the right to property”,64 nor do they pursue an immediate 
purpose of preventing the entities concerned from pursuing economic activities within 
                                                          
50 Ibid, paragraph 102. 
51 Ibid, paragraph 128. 
52 Mykola Azarov, T-215/15, supra note 16, paragraph 100. 
53 Kiselev, supra note 7, paragraph 114. 
54 Ibid, paragraph 76. 
55 Almaz-Antey, supra note 8, paragraph 112. 
56 Ibid, paragraph 128. 
57 See, for instance, Gazprom, supra note 9, paragraph 135. 
58 Ibid, paragraphs 143 and 144; Rosneft, supra note 10, paragraph 147; Rosneft and others, supra note 10, 
paragraphs 156 and 157. 
59 Kiselev, supra note 7, paragraphs 76 and 116 to 119. 
60 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 17. 
61 Ibid, Article 16. 
62 Rotenberg, supra note 6, paragraph 167. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Mykola Azarov, T-215/15, supra note 16, paragraph 85. 
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the EU.65 Finally, although the restrictive measures cannot be seen as breaching the right 
to reputation of the persons concerned, especially since, in the case of Ukrainians being 
accused of misappropriation of public funds, their imposition does not involve any view 
on their culpability,66 the right to reputation may justify an applicant’s continuing interest 
in bringing proceedings.67 This is all the more so when the person concerned is a 
politician.68 Therefore, even if by the time a claim arrives to the Court the legal basis for 
the restrictive measure has been amended and no longer contains the name of the 
applicant, the latter can still have a continuing interest in bringing the proceedings. 
 
2. Impact of the CJEU rulings on the CFSP framework  
Has the Court seized the opportunity of the caseload on sanctions against Russians and 
Ukrainians to make the CFSP framework evolve? It is submitted that the CJEU has been, 
so far, unable or unwilling to impulse strong evolutions as a response to the criticisms of 
the CFSP legal framework. This does not mean, however, that it has not shown some 
activism in that area. 
 
2.1. Limited evolutions in the CFSP framework 
The Court’s failure to address the main issues linked to judicial review of restrictive 
measures 
In a certain number of aspects, the case law of the CJEU on sanctions against Russians 
and Ukrainians has not addressed the main issues of the CFSP framework. This is true, 
firstly, regarding the particularly wide margin of appreciation of the Council when 
adopting restrictive measures. While in most of the cases in which sanctions were 
annulled the Court put the emphasis on the non-compliance of the Council with the 
obligation to state reasons and to rely on a sufficiently solid factual basis, the fact is that 
the latter remains in principle free to adopt these restrictive measures. In most of its 
judgments the Court has recalled the broad discretion of the Council in areas that involve 
political, economic and social choices. This institution has to make complex assessments 
and must examine if the objectives of the adopted measures are consistent with the 
objectives of external action set out in Article 21 TEU.69  
 
This has been confirmed regarding sanctions targeting Russians: they are adopted for 
the purposes of the protection of essential EU security interests and the maintenance of 
international peace and security,70 which allows for negative consequences to be borne 
by individual operators71 such as Russian undertakings.  
 
The confirmation of the wide margin of appreciation of the Council is also notable when 
it comes to the adjudication of sanctions targeting former Ukrainian leaders. The Court 
has proved to be flexible regarding the extent to which the Council could target persons 
being suspected of misappropriation of public funds in Ukraine. Its earliest case law 
repeatedly asserted that the Council was not obliged to verify if the investigations to 
which applicants were subjected were well founded, nor the facts on which they relied 
on in order to carry out the investigations. This was justified by the fact that “in adopting 
the contested acts, the Council does not seek itself to punish the misappropriation of 
                                                          
65 Ibid, paragraph 91. 
66 Klyuyev, T-340/15, supra note 20, paragraph 135. 
67 Ibid, paragraph 31; Portnov, supra note 19, paragraph 30. 
68 Klyuyev, T-340/15, supra note 20, paragraph 31.  
69 See, for instance, Rosneft, supra note 10, paragraphs 113 to 116. 
70 Ibid, paragraph 112. 
71 Ibid, paragraph 150. 
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public funds being investigated by the Ukrainian authorities, but to protect the possibility 
of the authorities identifying such misappropriation and recovering the funds”.72  
 
This wide margin of appreciation of the Council is further reinforced by the limited 
jurisdiction of the Court over restrictive measures in the meaning of Articles 24 TEU and 
275 TFEU. It still does not review the substance or appropriateness of the restrictive 
measures, and mainly continues to confine itself to compliance of the Council with the 
procedural rules and the obligation to state reasons. 
 
Another aspect of the CFSP framework that might not have been sufficiently addressed 
by the Court relates to the protection of the fundamental rights of the targeted persons. 
The Court has often had the opportunity to strike a balance between the objectives of 
the CFSP and the fundamental rights of the persons concerned. In most cases, this was 
done at the expense of the latter, in particular regarding the right to property and to 
pursue an economic activity within the EU, the right to reputation and the freedom of 
expression.73 Such a situation is obviously linked to the important margin of appreciation 
enjoyed by the Council in that field. 
 
This tendency of the Court to give precedence to the objectives of the CFSP is all the 
more worrying that the current framework for the imposition and the challenging of 
restrictive measures is, in itself, not favourable to the protection of these rights. The 
majority of such sanctions are usually prolonged every six months or yearly until they are 
lifted. Thus, by the time the claim of a targeted person is assessed by the General Court, 
those sanctions have already ceased to be in force and have been renewed by the 
Council on a new legal basis.74 Moreover, the fact that the sanctions regulations usually 
do not provide for penalties or lifting conditions can lead to issues of effective judicial 
protection.75 To quote H. Over de Linden, “using sanctions to ‘buy time’ is an extremely 
effective tool in the CFSP policy and […] explains the Council’s ultimate goal in such 
cases, because individual conditions can be changed irreversibly by their imposition, 
regardless of the outcome of annulment actions”76. The CJEU case law on sanctions 




The Court’s clear desire for cautiousness due to political considerations 
 
The limited impact of the analysed case law on the CFSP legal framework is due, to a 
certain extent, to the Court’s awareness of the highly intergovernmental dimension of the 
CFSP. When reviewing the legality of restrictive measures, the Court is adjudicating in 
one of the most intergovernmental EU policies, with highly political and sensitive issues 
at stake. In the field of foreign policy more than in any other, the Court is aware that the 
power of its judgments rests on their acceptance by the Member States. An example of 
that is the Rosneft case, in which the Court ruled that CFSP sanctions can be taken into 
review in the framework of a reference for a preliminary ruling.77 The Court gave an 
illustration of its “equilibrist position”:78 its boldness as to the extent of its competence in 
                                                          
72 Mykola Azarov, T-215/15, supra note 16, paragraph 145. 
73 See, for instance, Kiselev, supra note 7; Rotenberg, supra note 6.  
74 For an illustration of the difficulty for targeted persons to challenge the restrictive measures, see Rosneft 
and others, supra note 10, paragraph 105. 
75 H. OVER DE LINDEN, “The Court of Justice's Difficulty with Reviewing Smart Sanctions as Illustrated by 
Rosneft”, European Foreign Affairs Review n°3, 2019, p.28. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Rosneft, supra note 10. 
78 I. BOSSE PLATIERE Isabelle, “Le juge de l’union, artisan de la cohérence du système de contrôle 
juridictionnel au sein de l’Union européenne, y compris en matière de PESC, Note sous CJUE, Gde ch., 28 
March 2017, C-72/15, Rosneft”, RTDE, 2017. 
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preliminary rulings is then counterbalanced by a dismissal of all the presumed grounds 
for invalidity of the act and a confirmation of the Council's wide discretion.79  
 
The case law of the Court has also showed a certain will to ensure the effectiveness of 
restrictive measures, in a context in which their massive use “has gone in parallel with 
the attempt of the [EU] to strengthen its dimension at the external level as a part of its 
coercitive diplomacy”.80 The Court seems to be aware of the complexity of the 
implementation of targeted sanctions: identifying individuals and entities requires 
detailed knowledge that is difficult to obtain.81 At the same time, in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of measures such as asset freezes, the EU wishes them to apply 
immediately in order to prevent any asset flight outside the EU.82 It seems fair to assume 
that the Court took those facts into account when adjudicating EU sanctions against 
Russians and Ukrainians.  
 
This concern to ensure the effectiveness of restrictive measures is all the more obvious 
since some judgments have demonstrated the Court's determination to confirm the 
validity of the sanctions at all costs. An example of that is the Court’s reasoning on 
compliance by the Council with the provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (“PCA”) signed with Russia in 1999.83 In cases such as Rosneft, the 
applicants argued that by imposing restrictive measures on them, the Council violated 
Articles 10(1), 12, 36 and 52 of the PCA, which provide for the liberalisation of economic 
relations between the EU and Russia. The Court rejected such a plea, relying on Article 
99 (1) (d) of the PCA. This provision states that one of the Parties to the Agreement may 
take measures which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests, for example in case of a threat to peace and international security.  
The Court considered that the disputed measures had been adopted in order to protect 
essential EU interests, and to maintain peace and international security.84 Moreover, and 
in any case, the Court recalled the broad discretion of the Council in that field.85 This 
reasoning is debatable. In no way can it be deduced from Article 99 of the PCA that one 
Party to the Agreement can sanction the other in such a way, for obvious reasons: 
allowing such a possibility would go against the objectives of the PCA, which were to 
strengthen cooperation and economic ties between the EU and Russia.  
 
2.2. A notable activism of the Court through its adjudications of the 
sanctions  
The fact that the CJEU case law on sanctions against Ukrainians and Russians has not 
revolutionized the CFSP framework does not mean that there is no desire for a change. 
On many aspects, this case law did have an impact on the CFSP legal framework. For 
the purpose of this contribution, attention will be paid to two main aspects: the Council’s 
practice of adoption of restrictive measures, and the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction 
over restrictive measures.  
 
                                                          
79 Ibid. 
80 A. ALÍ, supra note 3, p.49. 
81 F. GIUMELLI, “Winning without Killing: The Case for Targeted Sanctions”, in DUCHEINE Paul, OSINGA 
Frans (eds.), Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, Asser Press, The Hague, 2017, p.93. 
82 House of Lords, supra note 1, paragraph 47. 
83 Agreement of Partnership and Cooperation establishing a partnership between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part, JO L.327. 
84 Rosneft, supra note 10, paragraph 112. 
85 Ibid, paragraph 113. 
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Impact of the CJEU case law on the Council’s practice of sanctions 
The analysed case law of the CJEU has most certainly reinforced a trend of influencing 
the practice of the Council when it adopts restrictive measures. A significant number of 
sanctions that have been overturned by the Court were annulled because of the Council's 
failure to comply with procedural rules or with the obligation to state reasons. Although it 
cannot be reasonably asserted that the Court brought the Council to significantly change 
the substance of its policy, the latter might be more diligent in complying with the rules 
of procedure and the obligation to state reasons: “in recent years, it seems that the quality 
of sanctions listing has improved, with better definition and more substance underpinning 
the reasons for listing”.86  
 
One example of the Court reminding the Council that it needs to comply with the rules 
concerned is the Stavytskyi case: the applicant argued that the alleged acts of 
misappropriation of public funds which were the subject of proceedings by the Ukrainian 
authorities had already been examined, a few years earlier, by Ukrainian courts, which 
had found nothing illegal.87 Therefore, since the Council could not prove that the 
Ukrainian jurisdictions had complied with the ne bis in idem principle, it did not have 
sufficient evidence to maintain the applicant’s name on the list of sanctions.88 The Court 
confirmed this argument.89 
 
More importantly and globally, the CJEU case law has had an impact on the Council’s 
discretion when adopting sanctions based on the decision of a third State authority. This 
is particularly true regarding the restrictive measures adopted against Ukrainian persons 
that are being prosecuted in their country for the misappropriation of public funds. In its 
earliest case law, the Court had confirmed the wide margin of appreciation of the Council 
when adopting such sanctions. Those measures contributed to facilitating the 
prosecution of such crimes and, therefore, to fighting corruption and re-establishing the 
rule of law in Ukraine.90 The Court dismissed applicant’s claims based on an alleged 
dysfunctioning of Ukraine’s political and judicial system, in which the prosecutions for 
misappropriation of public funds would be used to target former political opponents. The 
Court stressed that Ukraine was a member of the Council of Europe, and that its new 
regime was recognized as lawful by both the EU and the international community.91 
Therefore, the Council was free to rely on the decisions of Ukrainian prosecutors in order 
to impose the sanctions. In its most recent case law, however, the Court has significantly 
changed its approach. Before acting on the basis of a decision of a Ukrainian prosecutor, 
the Council must now verify whether such decision was adopted in compliance with the 
rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection.92 Such obligation is 
twofold: firstly, the Council must ensure that at the time of the adoption of the decision, 
the authorities of the third State complied with these fundamental rights.93 Secondly, the 
Council must explain the reasons why it considers that such decision was adopted in 
compliance with those rights.94 Moreover, the Court has stressed that if a targeted person 
has been subject to restrictive measures for several years, due to the same preliminary 
investigations, the Council must “explore in greater detail the question of a possible 
                                                          
86 A. ALÍ, supra note 3, p. 61. 
87 Stavytskyi, supra note 18, paragraph 112. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid, paragraph 129. 
90 Mykola Azarov, T-215/15, supra note 16, paragraph 155. 
91 See, for instance, Arbuzov, T-221/15, supra note 17, paragraph 146. 
92 See, for instance, Court of Justice, 19 December 2018, Mykola Azarov v. Council, C-530/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:1031, paras 35-42; Court of Justice, 26 September 2019, Klymenko v. Council, C-11/18 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:786, para 21. 
93 See, for instance, General Court, 11 July 2019, Klymenko v. Council, T-274/28, EU:T:2019:509, paragraph 
47 ; Klymenko, T-295/19, supra note 32, paragraph 66. 
94 Ibid.  
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infringement of the fundamental rights of [the person concerned] by the Ukrainian 
authorities”.95 The Court has, thus, raised the standard of evidence that must be provided 
by the Council when adopting sanctions. These developments will inevitably impact the 
Council’s practice of restrictive measures in the future.  
 
 
The extension of the Court’s jurisdiction over restrictive measures 
 
Due to the strong intergovernmental dimension of the CFSP, the treaties provide for a 
limited jurisdictional competence of the CJEU over CFSP acts. Pursuant to Article 24(1) 
TEU96 and Article 275(1) TFEU, it cannot in principle adjudicate such acts. These 
provisions have been described by some authors as a “carve-out”97 since they introduce 
a derogation to the principle of general jurisdiction of the Court over matters related to 
EU law, as laid down in Article 19(1) TEU. However, the second subparagraphs of 
Articles 24(1) TEU and 275 TFEU contain a sort of ‘exception to the exception’, a so-
called ‘clawback” 98 clause: the CJEU has jurisdiction to review the legality of restrictive 
measures targeting natural or legal persons.99  
 
Until recently, the scope of this judicial review remained unclarified. The Court itself 
traditionally refused to proceed to such a clarification. In its Opinion 2/13, it merely stated 
that it had not yet had the opportunity to specify the scope of the limitations on its 
jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 24 TEU and 275 TFEU,100 and that certain acts adopted 
in the context of the CFSP are beyond the Court's judicial control.101 The Court did not 
define the scope of these limitations. 
 
The Rosneft case law, however, significantly changed this approach. According to L. 
Coutron, “the Rosneft judgment will certainly be remembered as one of the major 
judgments of 2017 and, probably, as one of the major judgments of the Court”.102 The 
Court seized the opportunity of this case to clarify the scope of its jurisdiction over 
restrictive measures. 
 
The context of the Rosneft case was as follows: CFSP acts imposing restrictive 
measures had been adopted by the EU, and the UK had enacted domestic implementing 
measures. Rosneft challenged these domestic acts by bringing, firstly, an action against 
them before the domestic courts and, secondly, an action for annulment of the EU 
decision and regulation before the General Court. Acting in compliance with the Foto-
Frost103 case law according to which only the CJEU can declare an act of EU law invalid, 
                                                          
95 Stavytskyi, T-290/17, supra note 18, paragraph 132 ; Klyuyev, T-305/18, supra note 20, paragraph 81.  
96 Article 24(1) TEU, subparagraph 2, states that the “the Court of Justice of the European Union shall not 
have jurisdiction with respect to [CFSP] provisions”.  
97 See, for instance, P. VAN ELSUWEGE, “Judicial Review of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: 
lessons from the Rosneft case”, Verfassungsblog on matters constitutional, 6 April 2017, retrieved 15 March 
2019, https://verfassungsblog.de/judicial-review-of-the-eus-common-foreign-and-security-policy-lessons-
from-the-rosneft-case/ 
98 This expression has been used by numerous authors. For instance, see P. VAN ELSUWEGE, supra note 
97. 
99 Article 275 TFEU, second subparagraph, states that “the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor 
compliance with Article 40 of the Treaty on the European Union and to rule on proceedings, brought in 
accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth subparagraph of Article 263 [TFEU], reviewing the 
legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the 
Council”. Article 24(1) TEU, subparagraph 2 alludes to “the exception of [the CJEU’s] jurisdiction to monitor 
compliance with Article 40 [TEU] and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by Article 275 
[TFEU]”.  
100 Court of Justice, 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 251. 
101 Ibid, paragraph 252. 
102 L. COUTRON Laurent, Justiciabilité des actes de la PESC : où la Cour s'arrêtera-t-elle ? Revue de droit 
public n°6, November 2017, p. 1627. 
103 Court of Justice, 22 October 1987, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 314/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452. 
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the domestic court referred the matter to the Court for an assessment of the validity of 
the contested EU acts. One question asked to the CJEU was about the mere possibility 
for domestic judges to issue such a reference for a preliminary ruling on the basis of 
Article 267 TFEU, given the limited jurisdiction of the CJEU in the field of CFSP. Article 
275 TFEU only provides for the possibility of the Court to adjudicate restrictive measures 
in the framework of an action for annulment in the meaning of Article 263 TFEU.  
 
The Court answered this question by establishing its own competence to give such a 
preliminary ruling on the basis of Article 267 TFEU. It recalled that the preliminary ruling 
on the assessment of validity is a means of reviewing the legality of Union acts, just like 
an action for annulment.104 In support of that decision, the Court relied on the notion of 
complete system of legal remedies.105 It also insisted on the difference in wording 
between Articles 24 TEU and 275 TFEU regarding the ‘claw-back’ provisions: the 
reference in Article 24(1) TEU to the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU concerns the 
type of decisions whose legality may be reviewed by the Court (i.e. restrictive measures), 
and not the type of procedure (i.e actions for annulment) in which the Court may assess 
the validity of certain decisions.106 This reasoning opens the possibility for the 
admissibility of references for preliminary ruling on the validity of these decisions. The 
Court also relied, inter alia, on Article 29 TEU and on the logic of consistency of legal 
remedies: Member States must ensure that their national policies comply with the 
relevant CFSP decisions. The Court concluded that the implementation of these 
decisions is in part the responsibility of the Member States.107 As a result,  
 
“a reference for a preliminary ruling on the validity of a measure plays an essential 
part in ensuring effective judicial protection, particularly, where, as in the main 
proceedings, both the legality of the national implementing measures and the legality 
of the underlying decision adopted in the field of the CFSP itself are challenged within 
national legal proceedings”.108 
 
Therefore, in this judgment, the Court adopted a different position than that of Advocate 
general Kokott in the framework of Opinion 2/13. While regretting the absence of 
preliminary ruling jurisdiction of the Court in the field of CFSP,109 she considered it as the 
logical consequence of the EU legislator’s choice to maintain the CFSP along 
intergovernmental lines.110 Although in its Opinion 2/13 the Court seemed to have 
followed this opinion, this was no longer the case in Rosneft. 
 
To conclude, the CJEU case law on sanctions against Russians and Ukrainians did have 
an impact on the CFSP legal framework in the sense that it has showed a particular 
concern of the Court for the respect of the rule of law and the guarantees of an effective 
judicial protection. In Rosneft, the Court recalled that the rule of law is one of the primary 
values on which the EU is founded, as is stated in Article 2 TEU and in Article 21 TEU 
concerning the EU’s external action.111 Extending the legal possibilities of assessing the 
validity of CFSP decisions represented a “considerable step forward in the judicial 
protection of litigants”.112 More globally, by laying down the basis for extended control 
over restrictive measures and increased protection of the applicant’s fundamental rights, 
the Court seems to be strengthening the credibility of the Union's foreign policy on the 
                                                          
104 Rosneft, supra note 10, paragraphs 169 and 170. 
105 Ibid, paragraph 67. 
106 Ibid, paragraph 70. 
107 Ibid, paragraph 56. 
108 Ibidem, paragraph 71. 
109 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Opinion procedure 2/13, delivered on 13 June 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2475, paragraph 101. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Rosnft, supra note 10, paragraph 72. 
112 L. COUTRON, supra note 102, p.1627. 
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international scene, which is not superfluous when it comes to sanctions against 
Russians and Ukrainians. The Court seems to be aware that “if the Union wants to use 
its power to impose sanctions effectively and therefore improve its foreign policy, it must 
necessarily refine and offer acceptable solutions to the most important issues”113 of the 
CFSP. This is particularly true when it comes to autonomous sanctions, since they are 
adopted on the EU’s pure initiative.  
 
 
3. Perspectives of evolution? 
This section explores the potential consequences that may arise from the CJEU case 
law on sanctions against Ukrainian and Russian persons. For obvious reasons, it is 
unlikely that a reform of the CFSP through a revision of the Treaties will take place any 
time soon. In spite of its traditionally political cautiousness towards the CFSP, the CJEU 
therefore remains the institution that is best suited to trigger evolutions. This is all the 
more so since numerous proceedings and appeals on sanctions against Russia are still 
pending before the Court. In addition, the litigation on other waves of sanctions before 
the Court has not diminished. What trends can we expect within the CFSP legal order?  
 
3.1. Towards an increasing reparation of the damage suffered by the 
targeted persons? 
 
This issue is of utmost interest, especially in view of the amount of sanctions imposed 
on Russian and Ukrainian persons that have been annulled by the Court, as well as the 
negative consequences of restrictive measures on the targeted persons. The issue of 
actions for damages was not addressed by the CJEU in Rosneft, leaving the door open 
to potential developments.  
 
From the targeted persons’ side, obtaining the award of damages under the current EU 
and CFSP law framework remains highly difficult. The unlawfulness of an EU decision is 
not sufficient to allow for the award of damages: there must a sufficiently serious breach 
of EU law.114 However, in Safa Nicu Sepahan the CJEU established the possibility for an 
undertaking to be awarded damages under Article 340 TFEU for the damage caused to 
its reputation, which was considered as a sufficiently serious breach of EU law.115 
Although the circumstances of the case were very specific,116 this judgment was the first 
case in which the Court granted damages in the context of country sanctions, which 
could pave the way for future actions for damages.117 Even though it was not related to 
sanctions against Russians and Ukrainians, nothing seems to prevent the applicants 
targeted by those measures to claim for damages, provided that the relevant conditions 
are fulfilled. Moreover, the low number of CFSP cases having led to an award of 
damages could be due to the behaviour of the applicants. When challenging the 
sanctions, their main interest might be to have their name cleared and to avoid complex 
and costly procedures. It can be reasonably assumed that a judgment relating to 
sanctions against Russian or Ukrainian persons, and awarding damages, could be 
sufficient to trigger a trend of claims for damages. 
 
                                                          
113 A. ALÍ, supra note 3, p. 54.  
114 See, for instance, General Court, 23 November 2011, Jose Maria Sison v. Council, T-341/07, ECLI: 
EU:T:2011:687, paragraph 33. 
115 General Court, 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan Co v. Council, T-384/11, ECLI: EU:T:2014:986, 
paragraph 83. 




3.2.  Towards a possibility of forum shopping? 
 
This possibility is one of the most probable perspectives of evolution in the field of CFSP. 
The Rosneft judgment could lead to contentious strategies on the part of the applicants. 
They may now bring simultaneously an action for annulment before the General Court, 
and a complaint before a national court in which they seek a referral to the CJEU.118 This 
could reinforce the protection of the applicants: it could increase their chances of having 
their case adjudicated faster by the Court.  
 
Such a forum shopping could lead to applicants circumventing the time limits for bringing 
claims,119 and especially the two-months’ time limit imposed on actions for annulment in 
the meaning of Article 263 TFEU. This probability of forum shopping can obviously be 
tempered by the TWD doctrine, as a result of which cases cannot lead to a preliminary 
reference if the two-months limit to bring a direct action has expired.120 This question was 
also debated before the Court in case A and Others.121 However, and in any case, 
scholars remain confident that the Rosneft case significantly improved the targeted 
persons’ access to justice.122  
 
In any event, potentialities of forum shopping can be observed when it comes to 
restrictive measures adopted by the EU in order to implement UN Security Council 
Resolutions. Implementing measures enacted by the Member States can theoretically 
be challenged before both the European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU through 
a reference for a preliminary ruling. It might be preferable, from the perspective of an 
applicant subject to such measures, to have a national court refer to the CJEU. In the 
context of the European Convention on Human Rights, the rule on the previous 
exhaustion of domestic remedies inevitably implies a longer procedure. By contrast, the 
fact that national courts may now raise a question on the validity of restrictive measures 
can allow applicants to benefit from a faster procedure.123  
 
3.3. Towards further clarification of the extent of the CJEU’s jurisdiction 
over restrictive measure? 
 
Although the Rosneft judgment was a major breakthrough regarding the extension of the 
CJEU’s jurisdiction on CFSP acts, it also left some legal issues unsolved. Firstly, the 
Court remained silent regarding its competence to hear a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of CFSP decisions pursuant to Article 267(1)(a), in addition to its 
competence to rule over preliminary rulings on their validity. Advocate general Wathelet 
had, however, supported this solution, developing a particularly interesting argument: 
 
“if the European Union Courts can perform the broader task, that is to say, review the 
legality of decisions providing for measures against natural or legal persons […], then 
they can certainly perform the narrower task, which is to interpret the terms of such 
decisions, in particular so that they can avoid annulling or declaring invalid an act 
relating to the CFSP which they could otherwise have preserved by giving it a 
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Given the political sensitivity surrounding the adoption of sanctions, it could be in the 
Court’s interest to favour a consistent interpretation of CFSP decisions with regard to EU 
law, rather than annulling the challenged measures.  
 
Lastly, one can only hope for a clearer distinction between reviewable and non-
reviewable CFSP acts. It remains unclear from case law on sanctions against Ukrainian 
and Russian persons, and in particular the Rosneft judgment, which CFSP acts can now 
be reviewed by the Court. Since it has begun to rule on matters that may be strongly 
connected to political questions, “it is likely [that] the Court will soon have to develop and 
invoke an explicit political question doctrine in respect of EU foreign affairs”.125 This 
doctrine, initiated by the US Supreme Court in Baker v. Corr,126 consists in the 
determination by a court that a specific issue should not be decided by a judge.127 A court 
should not have jurisdiction over issues turning on policy choices or standards that defy 
judicial application.128  
 
The implementation of such a doctrine may present advantages. It does not affect the 
protection of human rights: a court has jurisdiction any time the question at stake is 
connected to those rights.129 At the same time, it does not entail risks in terms of 
separation of powers since it allows the legislator to maintain its broad discretion in the 
field concerned.130 The CJEU could use this doctrine as a means of clarifying the 
distinction between reviewable and non-reviewable CFSP acts, without giving the EU 
institutions the impression that it is taking too much active of a role. Although the Court 
has, so far, showed no indication of a will to implement this doctrine, one can assume 
that it might reconsider this position in the future, especially if it keeps extending its 





The above reflections illustrate the difficult position of the EU judges when adjudicating 
claims that arise from restrictive measures. On the one hand, if the CJEU shows an 
activism that is considered as excessive in relation to the specificities of the CFSP, it 
might expose itself to some criticism, in particular from Member States. By annulling 
numerous restrictive measures imposed by the Council, it also risks to undermine the 
effectiveness of a European policy that is already difficult to implement at the 
international level. On the other hand, when the CJEU remains too cautious in the field 
of CFSP, its reasoning is inevitably be called into question.  
 
In a global way, the CJEU case law on sanctions following the crisis in Ukraine did allow 
for significant developments in the law of restrictive measures. The Court had the 
opportunity to rule on a variety of legal issues, such as the admissibility of certain actions 
for annulment or the possibility to sanction actions of destabilisation of a third State by 
another. Substantial developments were laid down regarding the possibility for the 
Council to adopt sanctions for the misappropriation of public funds, and the extent to 
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which it can rely on third States’ decisions. The Court has also showed a certain will to 
reduce the differences between the CFSP and other EU policies: it extended its own 
jurisdiction over restrictive measures, and has shown a greater concern for the protection 
of the targeted persons’ right to judicial protection.  
 
However, the case law on sanctions against Ukrainians and Russians is also a reminder 
of the main legal issues surrounding the adoption and the judicial review of EU sanctions. 
In the majority of cases, and sometimes at the expense of a sound and clear legal 
reasoning, the Court has confirmed the wide margin of appreciation of the Council when 
adopting restrictive measures. In many aspects, the CJEU judgments show the 
importance of political considerations when it comes to judicial review of EU sanctions. 
These issues should not be overlooked: through its judicial review of the sanctions, the 
Court plays a significant role in strengthening or undermining the credibility of the EU’s 
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